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Executive Summary 
This report has reviewed international experience in pncmg, financing and 
financial management in electrification programmes. Relevant conclusions are: 
• The ability of electricity utilities to maintain and expand electricity 
services is severely prejudiced if their financial viability is undermined 
through inappropriate pricing, financing and financial management 
policies. 
• Electricity pricing and financing should be undertaken within an 
integrated energy planning framework which establishes overall 
development goals and balances policy objectives between different 
economic and energy sectors. 
• Economic efficiency is not the only criteria to be applied in deriving 
prices for domestic electricity consumers. Equity considerations and the 
financial viability of the utility have often taken precedence. 
• Price regulation should be transparent and arms-length and should not 
result in the viability of the utility being undermined. 
• Tariff levels should, as far as possible, attempt to achieve overall cost 
recovery for the household sector as a whole. 
• Appropriate price signals (eg time-of-use tariffs) should be passed on to 
those consumers capable of adjusting their load patterns. 
• To achieve greater equity and access, tariff structures should allow for 
low connection fees. 
• External subsidies may be required for the lowest income categories as 
well as for rural electrification. 
• Where the possibility of external subsidies is constrained, cross-subsidies 
may be affected through uniform tariffs applicable to high and low level 
consumers and to urban and rural areas. 
• To minimise distortions in pricing signals, subsidies should first be 
applied to capital costs of connection, rather than to energy charges 
through the tariff. 
• Governments have a key role to play in facilitating the flow of private 
capital to electrification programmes, as well as making available 
concessionary finance from the fiscus where this is required. 
• Electricity utilities must maintain financial viability by ensuring that 
average prices more than cover their average costs. This will improve 
their self-financing ratio and the willingness of private capital, either to 
invest directly or to provide loans. 
• Utilities must be able to attract private capital as it is unlikely and 
probably undesirable that utilities will be able to finance all their 
investment from internally-generated funds and since external sources of 
finance from government and foreign donors is generally insufficient. 
• Rural electrification will, in many cases, compromise the financial 
viability of utilities and so concessionary finance will be required for such 
projects if they are desirable for economic, social or political reasons. 
• Financing is required to overcome the barriers to entry posed not only by 
high connection costs, but also by expensive electric appliances. 
• Current cost accounting methods are recommended, especially in 
inflationary environments, although the most commonly used approach 
is historical cost accounting. 
• The debt to equity ratio, the self-financing ratio and especially the interest 
coverage ratio are three useful measures to monitor financial performance 
of utilities, although 'desirable' ratios depend on utilities' specific 
circumstances. 
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This report was commissioned by the National Electrification Forum (NELF}. 
It is a review of international experience in electricity pricing, funding and 
financial management. The purpose of the report is to assess how these issues 
have affected electrification programmes in developing countries and to draw 
conclusions which will assist NELF in establishing appropriate electricity 
pricing and financing policies for South Africa. A successful electrification 
programme which enables widened access to electricity is ultimately dependent 
on the creation and maintenance of a financially viable electricity distribution 
industry. Financial viability is, in tum, crucially dependent on appropriate 
pricing and financing policies and financial management practices. The report 
is based on an extensive review of international literature. 
The review of electricity pricing commences with a discussion on prtcmg 
policies, the principles of economic efficiency and marginal cost-based prices. 
Some of the difficulties of this approach are highlighted, and additional, often 
more pressing, pricing objectives are noted, including the imperative of prices 
which will allow financial viability and prices which will achieve greater equity. 
Actual practice in developing countries is then examined with regard to tariff 
levels and structures. Tariff levels are compared with long run marginal costs, 
generally being much lower in developing countries. The tariff structures 
discussed include inclining block, single flat rate, two-part, unmetered and 
time-of-use tariffs. The question of subsidies is raised as well as the problems 
of implementing equitable life-line tariffs. 
The section on financing examines sources of finance and mechanisms for 
financing. Sources include private savings of end-users, government grant 
finance from the fiscus, foreign borrowings, utility self-financing, private loan 
and equity investments, cross-subsidies, taxes and levies from other consumers, 
foreign donors and international lending agencies such as the World Bank. 
Financing mechanisms discussed include special electrification funds, electricity 
cooperatives and the special case of rural electrification agencies. 
The final section reviews international financial management practices with 
regard to accounting, revenue and debt policies. Current cost accounting 
methods are favoured in theory, although historical cost accounting is most 
commonly used in practice. No cases where fund accounting is used were 
discovered. A review of revenue policies involves examination of rate of return 
on assets and equity, while debt policies involve parameters such as self-
financing, debt-equity and interest cover ratios. The importance of transparency 
in financial management is highlighted. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding success factors for electricity pricing, 
financing, and financial management practices in developing countries. 
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2. Electricity pricing 
2.1 Introduction 
This section of the report covers the literature review conducted around the 
subject of the pricing of electricity for domestic consumers. The objective of the 
review was to gain insights into international experience with pricing for large-
scale electrification programmes. 
The subject of pricing has attracted a huge amount of attention in the 
international literature. Unfortunately much of the material is concerned with 
pricing for bulk consumers and is confined to the context of industrialised 
countries. Nonetheless a great deal of work has been done on energy pricing for 
developing countries, especially within the framework of integrated energy 
planning. This section covers the following particular topics: 
• pricing principles; 
• the practice of pricing in developing countries; and 
• key success factors for electricity pricing and domestic pricing in 
particular. · 
2.2 Pricing principles 
A great deal of the literature on electricity pricing for developing countries has 
been either written, or influenced, by the prolific Mohan Munasinghe. Starting 
in the late 1970s Munasinghe has played a central role in promoting the use of 
marginal cost based tariffs, mainly from a World Bank platform (Munasinghe 
1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1992). A dominant theme in Munasinghe's 
writings has been the concept of integrated energy planning1• Although the 
pricing methodologies proposed by Munasinghe have been revised and 
improved over the years the basic concept of deriving electricity prices within 
the context of the energy sector and the country's general economic and 
development goals remains. 
2.2.1 Marginal cost-based pricing 
The starting point of the pricing approach advocated by Munasinghe and others 
is a belief that social welfare will be not maximised unless electricity prices are 
based on the marginal costs of supply, defined as the net change in total supply 
cost resulting from an incremental change in output. This theory assumes that 
in an economy comprising efficient markets, prices based on marginal costs will 
automatically balance supply capacity with system demand. 
A number of studies have criticised strict adherence to marginal cost-based 
pricing. Besant-Jones (1992:195) concedes that this approach is rather theoretical 
See 'An integrated frameworlc for energy pricing in developing countries,' 
(Munasinghe 1980) for a useful introduction. 
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and is difficult to implement. Some additional problems with marginal costs 
are: 
• whether electricity prices should be based on short-run costs or 
long-run costs2; 
• the fact that economic costs do not inClude sunk costs from past 
additions to supply capacity; and 
• the fact that marginal costs do not include any future operating 
costs attributable to past sub-optimal choices of capacity. 
For a complete justification of marginal cost-based electricity prices as the 
pricing policy, it is necessary to assume that the rest of the economy has 
already moved to prices based on opportunity costs, particularly prices of 
electricity substitutes, of energy using equipment, and of products 
manufactured with electricity. In reality, however, this assumption is never 
valid, and electricity pricing must therefore take account of the constraints that 
invalidate this assumption. 
A further macro-economic constraint on marginal cost based pricing is the fact 
that the required intensive analysis of inter-linkages among sectors is practically 
impossible for most economies, and hence a strictly optimal pricing policy is not 
feasible. This condition requires the marginal cost basis to be justified on less 
rigorous grounds, such as the assumption of both low cross-elasticities and 
interdependencies between electricity and other outputs. In practice therefore 
the approach to setting the prices of electricity has to start by focusing 
specifically on the economic and financial costs of power supply, explicitly 
disregarding these linkages, and subsequently modifying the prices to account 
for the constraints elsewhere in the economy that cause major distortions to the 
price signals for electricity use. 
Besant-Jones (1992:195-6) does in fact concede that since electricity costs are 
usually less than 5 percent of total operating costs for industrial, commercial 
and agricultural users, and likewise less than 5 percent of total household 
expenditures, a price increase above (or decrease below) marginal costs would 
in fact create only negligible distortions in the economy (Besant-Jones 1992:195-
6). This admission has particular relevance for the household sector where strict 
application of marginal cost-based tariffs could cause electricity prices to be out 
of the reach of the majority in most developing countries. 
In the short-run case, supply capacity is considered to be fixed relative to the 
level of output; in the long-run case, supply capacity is considered adjustable. 
SRMC therefore reflects changes in the costs of power systems operations from 
existing capacity in response to an increase in system demand. LRMC is the 
change in total system costs of meeting an incremental change in demand, 
sustained indefinitely into the future, when needed capacity adjustments are 
possible (Besant-Jones 1992:196). 
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2.2.2 Goals for electricity pricing 
The Industry and Energy Department of the World Bank spells out its approach 
to formulating electricity pricing policies in a paper titled 'Domestic Pricing 
Policies' (1989). The paper echoes Munasinghe's original five objectives for 
pricing policy (1980), namely: ·· 
1. efficient allocation of national economic resources; 
2. fairness and equity in: cost allocation, price stability and minimum 
levels of service · to consumers unable to afford the full cost of 
supply; 
3. financial viability of the power sector; 
4. tariffs simple enough to implement; and 
5. 'other' economic and political requirements such as subsidised 
electricity supply to certain sectors to enhance growth or to certain 
geographic areas for purposes of regional development. 
The proposed approach to reconciling these (conflicting) objectives is to start 
with the efficiency objective by calculating the Long Run Marginal Costs (LRMCs) 
of supply. The paper suggests that prices should then be structured so that 
they vary according to the marginal costs of serving demands: 
• by consumer category; 
• by season; 
• by hour of the day; 
• by voltage level; and 
• by geographical region. 
Once LRMC based tariffs have been established according to these criteria a 
second stage should be commenced whereby these strict LRMC based tariffs are 
adjusted to meet the other objectives, of which the most important one is the 
financial requirement. Possible adjustments suggested for the domestic sector 
may be a unifonn national tariff, or subsidised rural electrification. The paper 
notes that each adjustment deviating from the LRMC will impose an efficiency 
cost on the economy, and that the costs of this need to be weighed up against 
the benefits to be derived from such an adjustment. 
2.2.2.1 The question of equity as a goal for pricing 
Although the World Bank paper is quite clear that efficiency is the priority goal 
it is careful to state that this does not means that equity considerations are 
irrelevant. Rather, through careful tariff design (e.g. increasing block or "lifeline" 
tariffs) and a balance of project selection (e.g. a rural electrification component 
to the investment programme) it suggests a government can ensure that the 
living standards of the poor can be raised without significant loss of efficiency 
(Vedavalli 1989:24). 
Besant-Jones argues though that governments need to consider carefully the 
effect of imposing the costs of socio-political objectives on the power sector 
which compromise the efficiency objective for pricing, such as might occur 
under rural electrification programmes. For example, granting unduly low 
electricity prices to specific consumers for non-efficiency objectives could 
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stimulate demand uneconomically (Besant-Jones 1992:191-192). 
On the question of equity the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that 
there is a strong argument that rising fuel prices have a regressive impact on 
low-income groups, on the basis of evidence which shows that "the share of 
energy expenditure in the total is significantly higher for low-income groups 
than for high income groups" (IMF 1991:25). 
As to whether policy should aim to ameliorate this regressive impact by 
subsidising fuels for low income households the IMF argues that three factors 
need to be taken into account: 
1. whether or not the benefit of subsidies do indeed reach the low-
income groups; 
2. whether or not there may be unintended consequences. (Such as a 
multiplication of connection requests in the case of inclining block 
tariffs, or the adulteration of expensive liquid fuels with subsidised 
paraffin); and 
3. whether the potential benefits are limited to the low-income 
households or do in fact accrue to higher income groups. (Such as 
the case of rural electrification where wealthier households can 
afford to utilise the energy source, thus leading to greater levels of 
rural differentiation) (IMF 1991:25-26). 
The IMF concludes that, in general, direct help to the low-income groups would 
be more appropriate than subsidies and that, furthermore, any subsidies on 
fuels should be financed by general taxes on commodities (IMF 1991:26). 
Clearly, though, the practicalities of delivering direct assistance to low-income 
groups present severe difficulties, and in countries with inoperative or 
inefficient welfare systems cross-subsidies on fuels may be one of the few 
effective strategies for increasing the welfare of poor households. 
2.2.3 Strategies for electricity pricing in developing countries 
Because of the difference in conditions - economic, financial, institutional and 
technical - among the power sectors of developing countries, the literature 
generally concludes that there is no single best or universal approach to 
electricity pricing. For a particular country it is necessary to start from basic 
policy objectives in order to develop a strategy for electricity pricing that fits the 
country's general strategy for the structure and control of the power supply 
industry. 
In practice then, electricity pricing systems must be designed to accommodate 
both economic and financial objectives, where financial viability is a necessary 
condition for satisfactory supplier performance (Besant-Jones 1992:191-192). 
The Instituto de Economia Energetica/ Asociado a Fundaci6n Bariloche claims 
to have developed a set of methodological approaches to the analysis of the 
level and structure of energy tariffs within the context of macro-economic and 
energy policies. These methodologies take- into account problems of inequitable 
income distribution, satisfaction of basic needs, and the generation and transfer 
of natural and institutional rents. In line with Munasinghe's work on pricing 
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policy the Instituto de Economia Energetica/ Asociado a Fundaci6n Bariloche 
has pointed out the need for tariff structures which consider not only the 
financial balance of the supplier companies, but also the principles and 
objectives of social equity and environmental protection. On this basis an 
inclining block tariff structure is proposed for domestic users which, if properly 
designed, should guarantee long term economic and financial balance. 
In comparison with the classic marginal cost tariff this system is claimed to 
provide a concrete solution to the problems of unequal income distribution and 
of unequal access to higher quality energy sources (Bouille 1992:70). 
A further point is made that fuel substitution, which is encouraged by this 
pricing structure, has multiple environmental effects. It not only reduces the 
pressure on forest resources, as well as the excessive emission of carbon-
dioxide, but also benefits the end-users by diminishing emissions. This emission 
is regarded by the World Bank, in its report on World Development (1992), as 
one of the most acute environmental problems in developing countries (Bouille 
1992:70). 
2.3 Pricing practice 
This section discusses the practicality of some of the pricing objectives proposed 
by the theoreticians as well as the practise of electricity pricing in developing 
countries. A number of topics are covered, including subsidies, demand side 
management, taxation, rural electrification and finally price regulation. 
2.3.1 Industrialised country pricing practices vs. criteria for developing 
countries 
Given that the World Bank's proposed approach to electricity prtang for 
developing countries is fairly theoretical and, at points, highly abstract, 
questions have been raised as to the usefulness of the approach. Furthermore, 
the viability of applying these theories in even the developed systems of the 
industrialised countries has been challenged. 
In a paper by MacKerron the application of electricity pricing criteria in the UK 
during the early to mid-1980s is contrasted with the criteria required by aid 
agencies, such as the World Bank, when lending money to developing 
countries. He identifies two key criteria for the purpose of the study, namely: 
• the financial viability rule; and 
• the economic efficiency rule. 
In practice, MacKerron notes, many developing country governments and 
utilities have failed to follow one or both of these pricing rules. MacKerron 
suggests that, should industrialised countries, with their better developed and 
more sophisticated market systems, find it difficult to adhere to orthodox 
accounting and economic principles in their energy pricing policies, it would 
be logical to suggest that developing countries will find it even harder to do so. 
Choosing the UK as an example of an industrialised coUntry with sophisticated 
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energy markets MacKerron goes on to demonstrate that official British policy 
towards prices is indeed close to the policies commonly advocated for 
developing countries, i.e. a mixture of viability and efficiency, with preference 
given to the viability over the efficiency objective when the two come into 
conflictl. 
The paper then examines the extent to which the viability I efficiency pricing 
rules have been followed in practise during the 1980s in the British electricity 
supply industry. Without going into the details, which show, as MacKerron 
puts it, that the industry was being run on a policy of "financial viability with 
a vengeance" (1987:37), the conclusion is reached that, although the viability and 
efficiency rules have been present as considerations in pricing policies, they 
have not been the principle determinants of electricity price levels. Viability has 
been achieved (or over-achieved) for electricity and, in the efficiency area, 
whilst marginal cost-based tariff structures prevail, tariff levels have almost 
certainly been too high relative to marginal costs. 
Thus, he concludes, industrialised countries can systematically over-ride the 
efficiency rules in the interest of what governments see as more important 
policy objectives or constraints. Furthermore, MacKerron notes, the UK, like 
other industrialised countries, has a highly specialised energy policy-making 
organisation and a government with an ostensible commitment to limiting its 
own powers of intervention in order to allow market forces to determine 
economic and energy outcomes. If, in these circumstances, we find a market 
and political structure which does not achieve either viability or efficiency 
objectives we should not be surprised if developing country governments 
exhibit similar inabilities to achieve viability or efficiency in their price-making 
policies (MacKerron 1987). 
Given this stern warning on the viability or practicability of World Bank 
policies the following discussion of the actual performance of developing 
country pricing policies should not be unexpected. 
2.3.2 Developing country pricing policies 
During the 1960s electricity tariffs were not under serious pressure because of 
generally low inflation and interest rates, stability in oil prices and declining 
marginal costs arising from the capturing of economies of scale in power 
supply. During the 1970s and particularly the 1980s, however, administered 
tariffs for electricity in most developing countries have failed to track changes 
in supply costs which followed the rise in global inflation, oil price increases, 
and the growth in debt commitments from large borrowings and rises in 
interest rates (Besant-Jones 1992:51). 
Rather, many governments in developing countries have insisted on keeping 
tariffs below the economic costs of supply in order to support their economic 
It is commonly recognised that these two 'rules' may be mutually inconsistent if 
marginal costs are systematically below average costs. 
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policies for growth and inflation and maintain their social policies for protecting 
the living standards of low income groups. In some cases, delays in tariff 
increases have substantially weakened the financial position of power utilities 
and reduced their operating efficiency, even to the point of threatening the 
physical integrity of the power system in extreme cases. The build up in 
pressure for increases has eventually provoked' much larger and more 
disruptive changes to tariffs than required under sound price administration, 
so that tariffs have been far more volatile in developing countries than in 
industrialised countries (Besant-Jones 1992:53). 
In a paper prepared by the Technical and Administrative Unit of the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC, now SADC) for an 
energy ministers seminar on energy pricing4 the key problem with energy prices 
was seen to be the reluctance of governments to price energy to reflect its 
economic costs because of their concerns with the adverse effects of price 
increases on: 
• industrial competitiveness; 
• household budgets (especially low income families); and 
• inflation (in terms of its direct economic effects and its longer term 
social and political ramifications) (SADCC 1992). 
The SADCC paper points out that in the period 1973-88 electricity prices have 
generally been set below long run marginal costs and remain substantially 
lower in some countries5• Resolution of the pricing issue has been complicated 
by the fact that energy price-setting is typically the responsibility of 
government, rather than energy enterprises. In setting energy prices 
governments have tended to give more weight to industrial competitiveness, 
impact on household budgets and inflation, than economic efficiency or the 
financial viability of energy enterprises (SADCC 1992:10). 
2.3.2.1 Electricity tariff levels in developing countries 
A working paper of the Industry and Energy Department of the World Bank 
(1990) entitled 'Review of electricity tariffs in developing countries during the 1980's' 
provides a detailed, but limited, perspective of electricity tariff performance in 
the developing world. The report is based on data from some 60 countries and 
focuses chiefly on tariff levels in 198"r. 
The author notes that official working papers from the World Bank's Industry 
and Energy Department, Energy Series papers were used as a basis for the paper. 
These conclusions are reached on the basis of the World Bank Industry and 
Energy Department Working Paper, Energy Series Paper No. 13, April 1989, 
Domestic energy pricing policies. 
As the study did not extend to primary data collection some of the data, 
particularly that on the incremental costs of power expansion, is based on 
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At the outset the paper states that the two major principles for electricity 
pricing are that tariffs should reflect economic efficiency prices (in tenns of 
structure and level) and that tariffs should be set so as to make power utilities 
financially viable with an acceptable rate of return. Despite the fact that the 
World Bank has on many occasions recognised the potential for conflict 
between these two principles (and the existence ·of other legitimate pricing 
objectives) the paper goes on to review the performance of developing country 
utilities solely in terms of the first principle, effectively ignoring the constraints 
that the second principle may impose, or any other constraints for that matter. 
Nonetheless the results of the review illustrated the poor status of utilities: 
• the average level of tariffs in developing countries was only about 
55% of the average level in OECD7 countries; 
• the average level of tariffs in developing countries was only about 
half the level required to cover the incremental costs of the planned 
expansion of power systems during the 1990s; 
• average tariffs expressed in constant local price terms were far more 
volatile in developing countries than in the OECD countries; 
• electricity tariffs in 1987 were not based on the marginal costs of 
supplying electricity in nearly 80% of developing countries, even 
though the marginal costs had been studied in most countries; 
• over 60% of developing countries had no intention of basing tariffs 
on marginal costs in the near future (World Bank 1990:3). 
On the matter of domestic tariffs the survey had little to say, although a 
possible indication of the existence of cross-subsidies between industrial and 
domestic consumers was taken to be the ratio of bulk tariffs to low voltage 
tariffs. Since it is inherently more costly to supply low voltage consumers than 
high voltage consumers this ratio should be less than 1. Indeed, in the majority 
of OECD countries, chosen as a benchmark for the study, bulk tariff levels 
were between 50-75% of low voltage tariff levels. 
In developing countries, analysis of average tariffs by supply voltage level8 
showed that: 
• the ratio of bulk to low voltage tariffs fell outside the 50-7596 range 
in about three-quarters of the countries surveyed; 
• the ratio of bulk to low voltage tariffs for about one-quarter of the 
countries surveyed was greater than unity; and 
estimates. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, consisting of 
countries such as Switzerland, Portugal, Japan, Ireland, Greece, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, etc. 
For the 21 developing countries for which tariff yield data were available at all 
voltage levels. 
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• in a quarter of the countries bulk tariffs were below 50% of the low 
voltage rates, indicating substantial subsidies to bulk power users 
(World Bank 1990:13). 
The World Bank concluded that these results indicate that tariffs in these (21) 
countries do not reflect the costs of supply at different voltage levels and that 
there are major subsidies between industrial and domestic consumers (in both 
directions!) (1990:13). 
Whilst this report has some important limitations (e.g. reliance on imperfect 
data, such as unreliable exchange rates), and is oblivious to pricing objectives 
other than economic efficiency, it nonetheless serves to indicate the level of 
disarray in the electricity pricing policies of developing countries. 
The literature also reports that the process of revising tariffs lacks transparency 
in most developing countries, and often allows influential consumer groups to 
benefit from unduly favourable terms. In many countries, cross-subsidies 
between consumer categories encourages uneconomic use of electricity (Besant-
Jones 1992:51-53). 
The failure of electricity utilities to set prices at levels which at least cover their 
costs, has frequently been reported (not only in World Bank publications) as a 
fundamental constraint on their ability to deliver a reliable electricity service to 
current and potential consumers. In a COPED review of the electricity systems 
of 11 developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, it was found that 
revenues were frequently insufficient to cover costs, with the result that the 
quality of existing services generally deteriorated, and new investment were 
ruled out (De Oliveira 1991:84). In India and China, tariffs frequently were 
below actual costs, while in several African utilities, electricity prices did not 
even cover fuel costs. Examples include the Tanzanian utility, TANESCO 
(Kjellstrom et al 1992:96) and the Angolan utility (Horvei and Dahl 1993:21); the 
electricity prices in the latter are around 0.015 USc/kWh using the parallel 
foreign exchange rate, or 0.18 USc/kWh using the official exchange rate. 
Clearly, with revenue at such low levels, huge subsidies are required from the 
fiscus to sustain utilities' operations, let alone to finance new investment. 
Moreover, such sources of grant finance from the government are generally not 
easy to sustain, and carry huge opportunity costs in relation to other demands 
on the state. 
Similarly, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) operated under 
direct political control after independence, which hampered its ability to set 
prices at levels sufficient to meet the utility's revenue requirements. The 
consequence has been 'the progressive undermining of both the financial viability of 
ZESA and its standing as a recipient of donor funds for investment purposes' 
(Robinson 1993:170). 
In recognition of the serious constraints resulting from sub-economic electricity 
prices, many utilities in developing countries have begun the process of 
increasing their price levels and to levels which increase their financial viability 
(De Oliveira 1991:84). With an improvement in their financial status, apart from 
the additional revenue generated internally, utilities are more likely to attract 
external capital to finance new investments - whether these are aimed at 
increasing bulk supply capacity or widening household access to electricity. 
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2.3.2.2 Electricity tariff structures in developing countries 
In a review of electrification programmes in six countries Dingley (1988) found 
a range of domestic pricing policies which are s~arised in Table 1. 



















Inclining block for urban (4 blocks at 0, 
100, 200 and 300 kWh) 
Single flat rate for rural 
Uniform domestic tariffs for all regional 
distributors 
Intentions of introducing a two rate TOU 
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Fairly high connection fee, but with 
repayment facilities to assist access for the 
poor 
Inclining block (0-250 kWh at lowest rate 
then increasing for each 200 kWh 
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No connection fee 
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Uniform domestic tariff in all areas of 
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consumers 
No connection fee 
Inclining block (9 steep blocks) 
Uniform national tariff (urban and rural) 
Low connection fee 
Inclining block (4 blocks) 
Two level TOU tariff option 
Uniform national tariffs (urban and rural) 
No connection fee 
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Each of the countries included in Table 1 has implemented successful domestic 
electrification programmes, such that the lowest level of electrification is almost 
twice South Africa's current level of electrification. Conclusions which may be 
reached on tariff structures are: 
• that the principle of urban to rural cross-subsidisation is widely accepted, 
and is generally implemented in the fonn of a unifonn tariff for both 
categories (Dingley 1988:27); 
• that the practice of cross subsidising within the domestic consumer 
group, from high level consumers to low level consumers, is also 
widely accepted; and 
• that connection fees need to be kept low in order to make electricity 
accessible to the poor. 
In a survey by Eskom of domestic tariffs in the Southern African region the 
following pricing policies were found (as per Table 2): 
Table 2 Domestic pricing policies from eight Southern African .countries (Eskom 
1991). 
Country Domestic tariff structure Price level9 
(SAc/kWh) 
Botswana two part 37 
Lesotho two part 27 
RSA (Eskom) two part or flat rate (S tariff) 23 
Malawi low density (high income) areas - basic 20.5 
charge plus declining block at 250 kWh 
high density (low income) areas - basic 
charge plus inclining block at 150 kWh 
Swaziland two part 18 
Namibia flat rate 9 
Zimbabwe unmetered, load limiter or 8 
inclining block with basic charge 
Zambia unmetered, load limiter or two part 1 
Since Eskom represented prices only in graphical form these figures may be 
slightly incorrect. Of more concern, however, is the problem of relying on 
official exchange rates in translating tariffs from local currencies into SAc/kWh. 
These price levels reflect the average price per kWh at a level of 250 kWh per 
month. 
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Besant-Jones (1992:53) concludes that electricity tariff structures (for all market 
segments) in most developing countries are relatively simple. Few countries 
have incorporated the concepts of marginal costs or cost of service in tariff 
structures, even though marginal cost studies were carried out in most countries 
in the 1980s (1992:53). Nonetheless, as argued earlier, the advantages of 
applying marginal cost principles in deriving domestic tariff structures are 
rather doubtful. He also notes that 'domestic ... customers now usually pay a 
uniform energy mte instead of the complex block tariff mtes for various consumption 
levels that used to be applied, although some of these tariffs have a low rate for a limited 
amount of energy for residential use to help low income households' (1992:53). 
Although this statement on tariff structures does seem to contradict the 
evidence of the above two tables the intention to provide a measure of relief to 
low income households is consistent in all three research efforts. 
2.3.2.3 Time of use tariffs 
The literature on time of use (TOU) pncmg for domestic consumers in 
developing countries appears to be rather limited. In one of the few applicable 
papers titled 'Time of day pricing schemes for electricity utilities in developing 
countries', Babu Ram (1991) remarks that implementation of TOU tariffs in the 
domestic sector requires relatively large expenditure on metering, but that this 
must be weighed up against the propensity of these consumers to contribute to 
peak load. The comment is made that the introduction of TOU pricing schemes 
for domestic consumers may have to be considered on an optional basis with 
consumers bearing the additional metering costs in exchange for the 
opportunity to reduce their bills. A further point is made about the potential 
benefits of delaying the construction of additional power plants (Ram 1991:10-
11). No economic analysis of costs or benefits is, however, advanced to justify 
these remarks. 
Utilities in industrialised countries, particularly the United States, appear to 
have been experimenting with domestic TOU tariffs since the late seventies 
(Caves & Christensen 1983). One such experiment with volunteer households 
produced the following five key policy results: 
• participants in the voluntary programme exhibited a significant 
response to TOU tariffs, reducing their on-peak usage share from 
19% to 1596; 
• customer usage patterns and responses to TOU tariffs depended on 
appliance holdings and weather; 
• the response of the voluntary customers was substantially larger 
than the response of customers in prior mandatory TOU tariff 
experiments; 
• the volunteer population appeared to have on-peak usage shares 
under standard tariffs that were similar to the overall residential 
population; and 
• there was limited evidence that, as customers become more 
knowledgeable, those with higher usage shares tend to migrate back 
to standard tariffs (Caves et al 1989:84). 
Although no references could be found that dealt explicitly with TOU tariffs for 
domestic consumers the existence of these tariffs in some developing countries 
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has already been noted in the literature (such as Brazil and Greece in the above 
table). 
2.3.2.4 National vs. regionaVIocal tariffs 
Munasinghe makes the point that uniform nation-wide energy prices are a 
political necessity in many countries, although this practise implies cross-
subsidisation, e.g. urban consumers subsidising those consumers in remote rural 
areas where distribution costs are higher (Munasinghe 1983:9). 
He also notes that the full economic benefits of such a policy may be much 
greater than the apparent efficiency costs which arise from any divergence 
between actual and efficient price levels. In fact this policy is likely to have 
much more significant benefits in a developing country than in a developed 
country, not only because of the high cost of energy relative to incomes in the 
former, but also because the available administrative or fiscal machinery to 
redistribute incomes or achieve regional development objectives by other means 
is frequently ineffective. 
2.3.3 Subsidies and cross-subsidies 
The World Bank argues in its World Development Report 1992 that subsidies on 
energy contribute to wasteful uses of resources, and that their removal is one 
of the most important pre-requisites for improving the possibilities of increased 
economic growth in the developing countries (in SADCC 1992:11). An 
important distinction to make, however, is whether the World Bank is referring 
to: 
• subsidies to bulk electricity users or subsidies to low income 
domestic energy users; and 
• subsidies from the fiscus or cross-subsidisation within particular 
energy sub-sectors. 
On the basis of previous comments by Munasinghe on the role of lifeline tariffs 
it may be safely assumed that the World Bank is largely concerned with direct 
fiscal grants to meet utilities' operating deficits, as well as subsidies to non-
domestic consumers from the fiscus and large cross-subsidies between market 
segments, rather than cross-subsidies between consumers within the same 
market segment. 
As mentioned earlier an important component of pricing policy for domestic 
consumers is the redistributive effect of pricing structures. One of the most 
popularly advocated methods of achieving a progressive impact is the lifeline, 
or inclining block, tariff. This section therefore examines the role and experience 
of these tariffs as reported in the international literature. 
2.3.3.1 Lifeline tariffs 
Adjustments to efficient prices are often motivated on the basis of socio-political 
or equity arguments and these often take the form of 'lifeline', or inclining 
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block, tariffs. Economic reasoning based on externality effects is also used to 
support such cross-subsidy measures, e.g. to reduce excessive firewood use or 
to prevent deforestation and erosion (Munasinghe 1983:7). 
Munasinghe advances a practical economic model. based on income distribution 
arguments to assist with the design of lifeline tariffs. The model is intended to 
assist decision makers on the parameters of inclining block tariffs, namely, the 
number of energy blocks, the size of each block and the price for each block of 
consumption. In practise this requires a form of social weighting, based on 
empirical observations of the low income group within the country, and no 
generalisable law has been derived (Munasinghe 1983:8). 
2.3.3.2 Lifeline tariffs in the United States 
The potential drawbacks of lifeline tariffs are well illustrated by the case of 
California as reported by Hennesy & Keane (1989:123). 
Originally mandated by the state legislature in 1975 lifeline rates were justified 
on the basis of two assumptions: 
• that light and heat were basic human rights and must be made available 
to all the people at low cost for basic minimum quantities; and 
• that the declining block residential rate structure in place at the time 
penalised small-volume consumers and encouraged wastefulness. 
The size of the lifeline block was intended to provide for the essential needs of 
space heating, water heating, lighting, cooking and food refrigeration and was 
to vary by climatic conditions in the state and by season. The price of the 
lifeline block could not be greater than the average rates in effect at the time 
and could not change until the average system rate increased to greater than 
25% of the level of 1 January 1976. 
Almost immediately the problem arose of determining an essential needs' 
amount Special lifeline allowances were legislated for paraplegics and 
consumers dependent on life-support systems. In 1978 legislation defined air 
conditioning as essential for all consumers living in hot regions of the state. 
This proliferation of special interest groups eventually prompted an amendment 
of the original legislation, resulting in what was termed baseline rates. These 
. defined the baseline amount as 50 to 60% of average residential consumption where 
the baseline amount was priced from 15% to 25% lower than the system 
average rate (Hennesy & Keane 1989:124). 
An important point to note is that the Californian utility determines the revenue 
requirements of each consumer class separately and the practical effect of these 
tariffs is for high level consumers to cross-subsidise low level consumers. This 
effect has been the subject of intense debate and study in the United States with 
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a series of studies evaluating the social impact of the system10• Whilst it is 
clearly inappropriate to contrast the social conditions of an industrialised 
society such as the United States with the conditions pertaining in developing 
countries some interesting results are worth recording: 
• a study in Utah suggested that lifeilne rates are a relatively 
inefficient method for redistributing income and that the concept 
could be improved by establishing some kind of need criteria for 
eligibility, such as requiring customers to certify income levels. It 
concluded that the same results could be achieved at lower cost by 
providing direct subsidies to low income groups (Petersen 1982); 
and . 
• a study based on data gathered in the US-wide Annual Housing 
Survey showed that 45% of the low income group which a lifeline 
tariff is designed to help would be bypassed or possibly hurt by the 
introduction of such a tariff structure while on the other hand 38% 
and 31% of the middle and high-income groups, respectively, would 
benefit from such a tariff (Roll & Lande 1980); 
Despite the evidence of studies such as these, many states in the US continue 
to implement lifeline tariffs, largely as a result of political pressure from the 
electorate. Perhaps the most signifiCant lesson for developing countries is the 
inherent danger of combining this tariff structure with a decision-making 
system whereby public pressure can easily influence the level, size and 
qualifying conditions attached to the initial low price block of energy. Whilst 
this should in no way be construed as an argument against public 
accountability in pricing it should be noted that this tariff structure is more 
likely to be abused than others. 
In defence of the lifeline concept Hennesy quotes Berg as saying, 'opportunities 
are missed when our lack of complete understanding causes unnecessary delays. The 
goal of perfect policies is one of the greatest enemies of the achievement of good policies' 
(Berg in Hennesy 1984:340). 
2.3.4 Demand side management 
The issue of demand side management (DSM) and energy conservation features 
prominently in international literature on electricity pricing, particularly in 
relation to the domestic context. DSM objectives assume added importance in 
the context of an accelerated electrification programme because of the 
potentially adverse impact of typical domestic demand patterns on the overall 
system. Munasinghe's paper 'Third world energy policies: Demand management and 
conseraation' is a particularly useful contribution on the topic (Munasinghe 
1983). In the paper he makes the point that conservation is an important part 
of DSM and that it involves measures that specifically seek a deliberate 
See Hennesy & Keane (1989), Howe (1976), Pace (1975), Roll & Lande (1980), 
Frank (1977), Dahl (1978), Hennessy (1984), Petersen (1982) and Blocker 
(1985). 
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reduction in the use of energy below the level that would otherwise prevail. 
Such reductions involve: 
• elimination of outright waste; 
• reduction of energy-using activities; 
• substitution of one form of energy by another; or 
• substitution of other productive factors such as capital and labour 
for energy (Munasinghe 1983:9). 
Clearly though such energy conservation programmes need to be implemented 
only after determining whether their economic benefits exceed the 
corresponding costs (Munasinghe 1983:4). 
A key constraint in this regard is the fact that energy users who confront high 
opportunity costs of capital (as is often the case in developing countries), will 
find costly capital-intensive energy conservation measures relatively less 
attractive than users who have access to low-cost sources of capital. This factor 
is aggravated by the prevalence of market imperfections, particularly in the 
pricing of energy, in most developing countries. Where market costs diverge 
from real economic costs, such as in the presence of energy price subsidies or 
high tariff barriers on energy efficient appliances, individual consumers will 
tend to make economically inefficient energy-use decisions (Munasinghe 
1983:12). 
Munasinghe also makes the point that appropriate pricing is only one strategy 
among a wide variety of direct and indirect policy measures that can be taken 
to bring about desirable levels of energy conservation. Among them are direct 
regulation of energy uses, regulation of the use of energy-using equipment and 
appliances, mandatory standards, mandatory information requirements about 
energy consumption rates, taxes and subsidies, appropriate infrastructure 
investments for energy-saving facilities, education, propaganda and others. 
Particularly relevant strategies for domestic electricity consumers include: 
• disseminating up to date information; 
• improving conservation awareness; 
• installing more energy efficient equipment (particularly fluorescent 
lighting instead of incandescent bulbs11); 
• altering architectural design practices; and 
• using appropriate building materials (Munasinghe 1983:13). 
2.3.5 Taxation on electricity 
In a survey of industrialised countries the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
found that the average tax rate on electricity as a percentage of its pre-tax price 
was around 17 percent (IMF 1991:5). Interestingly it also found that taxes on 
electricity were substantially higher for domestic consumers than for industrial 
See Sathaye & Gadgil "Aggressive cost-effective electricity conservation: Novel 
approaches' for an excellent economic analysis of this topic. 
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consumers, who faced on average a tax rate of around 4 percent on the pre-tax 
price. 
In a survey by the UK based Electricity Association of a selection of 
industrialised countries various tax rates on dom~stic electricity prices were 
found (see Table 3). 
Little information on the taxation of electricity in developing countries was 
available, an indication perhaps that it is not a common practise. One exception 
was Brazil where a tax is levied at a flat rate per kWh, regardless of the fact 
that the tariff for urban consumers is an inclining block structure. Furthermore, 
there is no tax on the first 30 kWh and no tax for rural consumers. 
Table 3 VAT rates on domestic electricity prices in industrialised countries (Electricity 
Association 1991). 
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2.3.6 Rural electrification 
Literature on the topic of rural electrification tends to focus on the economic 
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costs and benefits of these projects and rarely touches on the issue of price12• 
Instead electricity prices are, it seems, generally taken as a given, as determined 
by national policy. The question usually addressed in the literature therefore 
becomes one of relative prices, where prices of other energy sources are 
determined by a combination of: policy prescriptions, market forces and free 
common property resources (such as wood). Furthermore, there is also the 
connection charge to be considered, the cost of wiring and the cost of 
appliances. As Anderson et. al. note (in Pearce and Webb 1987:336), 'it is the 
total cost, inclusive of appliances etc. that will detennine whether or not to connect to 
the system'. 
In a paper on the social financing of electrification Dingley (1990:12-13) does, 
however, show that subsidisation out of public funds is required for rural 
electrification to be viable. This, he remarks, needs to come from government 
funds or from foreign loans at low interest rates. He also comments that cross 
subsidisation among electricity consumers is widely practised, and is sometimes 
unavoidable if tariffs are to be kept simple. Care should, however, be taken not 
to impose too high an electricity tax on wealthy or large consumers. Nonetheless, 
Dingley does propose a flat rate tariff structure as a compromise between 
economic and social objectives. This is further justified on the basis of the 
practical advantage of simplicity and the facilitation of the introduction of 
prepayment metering. 
2.3.6.1 Remote Area Power Supplies 
On the matter of Remote Area Power Supplies (RAPS), as an alternative to grid 
electrification, there appear to be some difficulty in establishing clear guidelines 
for determining break-even points between technologies. An investigation by 
Sinha and Kandpal (1991:448) into the economic factors underlying India's 
extensive rural electrification programme showed conclusively, however, that 
for small and isolated villages with low load factors, decentralised energy 
technologies made economic sense. 
Local researchers, Eberhard and Borchers (1990:6), also remark on the difficulty 
of broad economic and environmental cost benefit analyses. Nonetheless, they 
do show, on the basis of narrow financial criteria, that photovoltaic (PV) RAPS 
systems can be cost effective for small energy users in remote areas. The 
comment is made that PV technology is based on a renewable energy source 
and that, with continued technological advances, PVs have the potential to 
provide not only for remote area power needs but also, in the longer term, for 
electrical power requirements closer to metropolitan centres. Given a growing 
awareness of environmental issues, such as the question of emissions from 
thermal power stations, it is argued that PV systems will become increasing 
attractive. 
Even Munasinghe in 'The economics of rural electrification projects' fails to 
develop any significant arguments around pricing for rural electrification. 
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2.3.7 Price regulation 
The topic of price regulation is both broad and contentious with perhaps almost 
as much literature devoted to it as the issue of pricing itself. As the original 
brief for this study did not call for an investigation into the regulatory aspects 
of pricing it is not examined in any detail. Some "pertinent comments on the 
topic by Besant-Jones are, however, worth noting. 
He reports that electricity tariffs have generally been administered by 
governments or their regulators to protect the interests of electricity users by 
controlling the monopoly power of utilities. An unfortunate side-effect of this 
arrangement in the context of the economic conditions that the developing 
countries have found themselves under in the 1980s has been 'lags between 
increases in supply costs and tariffs.' Besant-Jones (1992:51) attributes these to 
'technical and political limitations in the regulatory process'. The resulting distortions 
of tariffs from economic costs has led to inefficient supply and use of electricity. 
2.4 Success factors 
This section briefly covers some of the key success factors identified in the 
international review of literature on electricity pricing. 
Start with clear policy objectives 
In order to implement the necessary trade-offs between prtcmg objectives, 
particularly the efficiency vs. equity debate, it is essential to start with clearly 
defined national economic and development policies. 
Perform pricing within an integrated energy planning framework 
Rational electricity pricing policies are most appropriately arrived at within an 
integrated energy planning framework located within an overall understanding 
of the national economy. Policy-making in respect of electricity pricing should 
not be done in a narrow, supply-oriented manner, independently of other 
energy sub-sectors. In addition, policy-making should be consistent with overall 
economic and development goals. 
Tariff levels and subsidies 
Tariff levels should, as far as possible, achieve overall cost recovery for the 
domestic market segment. Significant deviations from this policy will severely 
prejudice the financial viability of the utility and hence its capacity to maintain and 
expand electricity services. 
Given the capital intensity of large scale electrification programmes and low 
income levels among potential consumers, it may not be possible to set 
affordable tariffs which will enable full cost recovery, in which case external 
subsidies may be required. 
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Ideally subsidies to the poor should be sourced from the general fiscus and 
should be direct, rather than take the form of cross subsidies via electricity 
tariffs. However, where welfare systems are not capable of delivering direct 
subsidies, uniform tariffs (across urban and rural areas) can facilitate rural 
electrification and wealth transfers from urban to. rural areas. In such cases, it 
may therefore be efficient, from a redistributive perSpective, to implement cross 
subsidies. 
Tariff structures 
Tariff structures for domestic consumers must take distributional effects into 
account and achieve the following: 
• ensure that electricity is accessible to the poor, via free or low 
connection fees; 
• reduce the regressive impact of electricity prices on low-income 
groups; and 
• pass on appropriate signals to high-income groups capable of 
demand side management by adjusting their load patterns in 
response to the price signal. This is most effectively achieved 
through time of use tariffs. 
Be clear which pricing criteria apply to which market segments 
There is clear consensus in the literature that various pricing criteria require 
different weightings in the policy formulation process for different market 
segments. To simplify this slightly the following distinctions can be made (Table 
4): 
Table 4 Brief summary of criteria weightings for domestic and non-domestic 
electricity pricing policies. 
Criteria Economic efficiency Financial viability Equity 
Non-domestic Second criterion Top criterion Important, but 
consumers usually interpreted 
as 'fairness' or 
'cost-reflectiveness' 
Domestic consumers Non-critical Top criterion, Very important, 
need to recover the the heart of the 
average costs of the debate. 
market segment Issues of 
(Although capital transparency, 
injections are distributive effects, 
common) external capital 
subsidies, etc. 
Ultimately economic efficiency appears to be given little weight by most policy 
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makers in the process of deriving domestic electricity tariffs. This condition arises 
from the following: 
• the relatively small size of the domestic market segments, which 
means that' overall price distortions in the energy market arising 
from 'non-efficient' domestic electricity prices are minimal (Besant-
Jones 1992); 
• the frequent existence of strong distortions in the price of substitute 
fuels, such as paraffin, comprises the efficiency benefits which 
would result from efficient pricing of electricity; 
• the difficulty of passing on appropriate pricing signals to domestic 
consumers, not only in terms of price levels, but particularly in 
relation to the varying costs according to time of use, because of the 
high cost of time of use meters; and 
• the relatively high weighting usually attached to the question of 
equity, generally interpreted, in the context of large income 
inequalities and. limited welfare systems, as the need to redistribute 
wealth via energy pricing mechanisms. 
Develop and maintain the institutional capacity for pricing policy-making 
A recognition of the difficulties of setting overall policy for electricity pricing 
emphasises further the necessity of developing and maintaining the institutional 
capacity to carry out such policies. This requires at least the following two pre-
conditions to be satisfied: 
• firstly the institutional capacity will have to exist to perform the 
integrated energy planning and overall economic anlllysis. Such 
policy formulation should involve planners, economists and 
engineers who should provide a framework for energy pricing to 
the decision-makers; and 
• secondly, institutional mechanisms empowered to implement such 
policies will also have to exist. 
Both of these planning and implementation functions will inevitably require a 
degree of centralisation, probably at a national level, if policy-making is to be 
truly effective. 
Price regulation systems should be open and transparent 
Price regulation systems need to recognise the rights of government, the 
electricity utility and other stakeholders to play a role in price-setting. 
Conflicting interests should be catered for in an open and transparent manner 
to prevent any one group dominating the process. Essentially government will 
always be involved in the process, but should be kept at arms length from the 
utility. Failure to achieve this may result in an abuse of power, which in the 
long term has frequently resulted in damage to the financial health of utilities 
and hence their capacity to expand access to electricity. 
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3. The financing of electrification 
3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the literature review conducted around the subject of the 
financing of electrification. The objective of the review was to gain insights into 
international experiences with the financing of large-scale electrification 
programmes, in order to identify factors which may assist in the planning and 
implementation of South Africa's own programme. 
Whilst there is a large amount of literature published internationally on the 
broad subject of financing in the energy sector generally and the electricity 
power sub-sector specifically, there is considerably less dealing directly with the 
financing of household electrification programmes. Nonetheless, some important 
lessons can be drawn from the experiences of a number of countries, such as 
Thailand, Argentina, Bangladesh and Brazil, which have all been involved, to 
a greater or lesser extent, in programmes to widen households' access to 
electricity. 
Several issues which have emerged from the literature review will be addressed 
in the following three sections: 
• possible sources of finance for electrification; 
• mechanisms and institutions for managing finance; and 
• key success factors. 
From a definitional point of view, it is understood that finance is generally 
required for two main kinds of expenditure in electrification programmes. The 
first and usually the largest amount relates to the initial . capital investment in 
new distribution and reticulation infrastructure; while the second relates to the 
finance which may be required to cover ongoing operating losses which are 
incurred when revenues from new consumers are insufficient to cover all 
operating costs. This is especially relevant where newly-connected households 
consume smaller amounts of electricity than required for utilities to recover 
their fixed costs. It is assumed that in the present discussion, financing 
arrangements may relate to both of these expenditure flows. 
3.2 Sources of finance for electrification programmes 
A wide range of sources of finance have been tapped to finance the investment 
required for electrification programmes in other countries. These sources carry 
different costs and conditions associated with their use, and inevitably almost 
all sources require some trade-off to be made against competing alternative uses 
of those funds. This section outlines the range of sources which may be 
available to finance electrification investments, based on international 
experience. 
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3.2.1 Private savings of end-users 
People who have sufficient incomes to allow them to accumulate savings, may 
be able to afford an upfront cash payment for connection costs, which therefore 
reduces the financing requirement of electrificatiof\ dramatically (where their 
cash payment relates not only to the final stage of metering and wiring the 
house, but to their share of total capital expenditure necessitated by 
electrification). In such cases, supply authorities require only short-term finance, 
and expect to recover connection costs from new consumers within a short 
period. Finance costs are therefore minimised, although there is also an 
opportunity cost for households who are diverting their savings from other 
possible applications. 
While this is a favourable option from the point of view of electricity utilities, 
it is clear that the lack of savings in most unelectrified households rules out this 
option. Most countries which have implemented large electrification 
programmes have faced this constraint, and at most, have required new 
customers to pay a small amount of cash as a deposit. 
3.2.2 Government grant finance from the fiscus 
In response to the inability of poor households to afford the connection cost, 
coupled with strOng pressures on government to deliver services to their 
constituencies, many governments have played active roles in ensuring that 
investments are made in distribution systems. One of these roles has been to 
encourage utilities to invest heavily in electrification, often with low tariffs, and 
to finance utilities' operating deficits on an ongoing basis from the fiscus (De 
Oliveira 1991). In other cases, governments have made fiscal grants specifically 
for electrification investment costs. In Ireland after World War Two, for 
example, the government provided a 50% capital subsidy for new connections 
(Foley 1990:172-173). With this sustained support, over the following thirty 
years, virtually 100% of rural households in Ireland were electrified. 
A capital subsidy scheme also operated successfully in New South Wales, 
Australia. The Rural Electricity Subsidy Scheme (RESS) ran from 1946 to 1983 
and provided each new consumer with a capital subsidy which usually covered 
all or most of their connection costs (Harrington 1986:14). This system financed 
the electrification of almost 100% of rural dwellings, funded 50% each by the 
Electricity Commission of NSW and the state Treasury. 
As Hill (1992:347) points out, the allocation of general fiscal resources to the 
electricity sector means that resource are diverted from other development 
sectors. In addition, where government revenues are insufficient to sustain high 
levels of expenditure, governments have often resorted to deficit financing, and 
mostly from foreign lenders. 
Other examples of electrification programmes in which the state has provided 
grant or concessionary finance for electrification are described in section 3 in the 
context of the institutions and mechanisms used for the management of finance. 
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3.2.3 Foreign borrowings 
The scarcity of local finance in many developing countries, together with the 
high liquidity of major lenders during the 1970s, were key factors which led to 
greater utilisation of foreign borrowings to finance power sector investments in 
developing countries. While these investments mainly entailed expansions of 
their generation capacity, expansion of their distribution sectors played a similar 
role. 
Investments in the electric power sector have accounted for a large portion of 
foreign borrowings in developing countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina 
and Thailand. As the experiences of some of these countries show, increasing 
debt levels can rapidly run out of control, to the extent where huge amounts of 
resources flow out of the country to meet debt obligations. In the case Mexico, 
for example, financing costs came to account for 50% of the average cost of 
electricity in 1985 (De Oliveira 1992:77). At the same time, the ESI debt in these 
countries contributed a significant portion of their total external debt. In Mexico, 
ESI debt accounted for 33% of foreign debt in 1970, increasing in real terms by 
11% per annum to reach $14 billion in 1982, while in Thailand, expansion of the 
power system resulted in huge increases in foreign debt, accounting for 20% of 
national debt by 1989 (ibid:79). Ultimately these high debt levels were 
unsustainable, and the 'debt crisis' which resulted, led to a shift in financing 
and pricing policies in utilities, towards a trend of improving their financial 
viability and self-sufficiency. 
3.2.4 Self-financing by electricity utilities 
A strong theme in the literature is the need for utilities to improve their self-
financing ratios, or in other words to increase the proportion of total investment 
funds which is met by internally-generated surpluses from operations. This, in 
tum, is closely related to the pricing regime in force in electricity utilities. 
In an important study, COPED (an international network of energy research 
institutions) reviewed the key issues facing the electricity supply industries 
(ESis) of eleven developing countries from Asia (China, India and Thailand), 
Africa (Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, Algeria and Zaire), and Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) (De Oliveira 1991:4). Several of the utilities had 
negative self-financing ratios because of their operating deficits. One of the 
primary findings in the study was that their ESis need to recover their financial 
viability and ability to invest: 'The self-financing ratio of utilities must be increased 
substantially to reduce external financial needs' (ibid:102). It was suggested that 
pricing policy should be restructured so as to allow utilities to generate 
operating surpluses, which should be applied to new investment. The COPED 
study argued that this was necessary to reduce the dependence on scarce and 
expensive private capital. At the same time, equity objectives need not be 
compromised by pricing policies which aim to cover average costs. Ultimately, 
the ability of ESis to make additional investments is a precondition for the 
achievement of their objectives, one of which is to widen household access to 
electricity. 
In South Korea, the government's policy since the 1960s has been to finance 
expansions of parastatals such as the Korea Electric Power Corporation 
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(KEPCO), as far as possible from within corporations themselves (Hill 1992:347). 
Whilst the major investment in Korea has been in the area of additional 
generation capacity, similar lessons could be applied to investments in 
distribution systems. KEPCO's capacity increased more than fiftyfold from 367 
MW in 1961 to 19 944 MW in 1988, and a large pel!~: of this was self-financed. 
From 1967 to 1988, between 39% and 100% of capital expenditures were 
financed from within KEPCO (ibid:349). Moreover, not only were investible 
funds increased through pricing policies, but additional resources were made 
available through technical efficiency improvements, with the result that the 
utility's self-financing ratio was further increased. As a consequence, KEPCO 
was well-placed to sustain and increase its investment levels. 
3.2.5 Private loan and equity investments 
Notwithstanding increases in revenues due to higher tariffs, financing 
constraints remain, because utilities can optimistically self-finance only a portion 
of their investment; according to De Oliveira (1992:83), this might account for 
40% of total financing requirements. Furthermore, concessionary support from 
government and multilateral and bilateral agencies is likely to be limited. Hence 
many utilities are moving towards inducing private capital investment (ibid). 
This is a consistent trend in many developing countries, where increased 
private sector involvement is seen as one of the few options for increasing 
investment levels (Barnett 1992:36, Churchill and Saunders 1989). The ability to 
attract private capital is closely linked with the previous point (about self-
financing ratios), since utilities are likely to attract private investors only if they 
demonstrate that they are able to finance their own operations by generating 
sufficient revenues to cover costs and make additional investments. 
However, a constraint in many LDCs is that there are no markets which 
channel private domestic savings into investment (De Oliveira 1991:98), and in 
these cases, institutional development is seen to be a priority. In South Africa, 
however, the same probably does not apply, since the country's financial sector 
is very well-developed, with banks and institutional investors having access to 
large amounts of private savings. 
3.2.6 Cross-subsidies, taxes and levies from other consumers 
Revenues generated from wealthier domestic and industrial consumers have 
been an important source of finance in several electrification programmes. 
In Argentina, major progress was made in widening household access to 
electricity over the period 1945 to 1985, with about 50% of the population 
having access to electricity in 1945 (only 12% in rural areas) and 88% of the 
total in 1985 (96% urban and 34% rural) (Bouille 1993:54). This was financed by 
the state through levying taxes on the petroleum sector, complemented by taxes 
on higher-income electricity and gas consumers (ibid:73). For the expansion of 
the electricity (and natural gas) networks, these funds were successfully 
channelled through the National Savings and Insurance Institute which acted 
as the financing institution. Only in the late 1970s did this arrangement become 
less efficient, when the state utilised this source of finance to assist in meeting 
its massive debt obligations. By then, however, electricity was already widely 
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available. Bouille recommends: 'FinanciDl mechanisms that will mobilise and orient 
local savings for energy investment need to be established. This could be based on the 
levying of a consumption tax on the high-income sector, luxury use, heavy polluters, 
or on imported energy fuels.' (ibid:76). 
Robinson (1993:179) quotes the Kenyan idea of placing a 296 levy on urban and 
large customers to generate finance for rural electrification. He also states that: 
'the pursuit of equity will inevitably entail a significant degree of cross-subsidisation 
in the tariff structure. This can be achieved without undue compromise to economic 
efficiency if marginal-cost pricing principles are applied to broad categories of 
consumers' (ibid:175-176). In other words, careful design of tariffs such that the 
poor are cross-subsidised, can contribute towards equity goals in the form either 
of lower tariffs for the poor, or of capital subsidies for their connection, financed 
by cross-subsidies from wealthier consumer groups. 
Likewise, in France, rural electrification was subsidised by a tax on electricity 
consumption, which 'represents a significant transfer of funds from urban to rural 
areas', via the Fonds d'Amortissement des Charges d'Electrification (Hourcade 
et al 1990:866). 
3.2.7 Lending agencies such as the World Bank 
Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank have a major influence on the 
financing of electricity investments, although this influence is often more of an 
intellectual nature than in the actual disbursement of funds (Barnett 1993:100, 
De Oliveira 1992:96). 
The World Bank has devoted relatively little attention to the electricity 
distribution industries of developing countries and has focused instead on large 
projects in the generation and transmission sectors (Collier 1984). For instance, 
Barnett (1993:103) reports that in the period 1965 to 1980, nearly 6096 of the 
Bank's power sector loans were for generation and only 9% for distribution. 
This is in spite of the fact that some 20 - 30% of utilities' investments are 
generally in the distribution sector, and that it often accounts for about 7096 of. 
total staff, 10096 of revenues and 60 - 80% of losses. 
In addition, the Bank's loans are generally granted only in respect of projects 
which are 'economically justifiable' (for example, World Bank 1991d:13, 
1991c:27). Consequently, the fact that many electrification programmes do not 
produce the rates of return required by the Bank, means that there are limits on 
its potential role as a lender in the distribution sector. 
Finally, it must be noted that the World Bank is also criticised very sharply in 
the literature for its narrow attention on financial or economic measures of 
progress at the expense of social and equity measures, as well as for the strict 
conditionality attached to most Bank projects. Consequently, there is a strong 
body of literature which views finance from institutions such as the World Bank 
as problematic. 
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3.2.8 Foreign donors 
Foreign donors, especially in the form of public sector agencies from 
Scandinavia, Europe, Canada, and Japan, have also funded a sizeable portion 
of electrification investments in many countries, par:ticularly in poorer ones like 
Bangladesh (Foley 1990:130). Usually however, these relationships have 
particular origins and histories which makes them not easily transferable or 
generalisable to other developing countries. 
3.3 Mechanisms and institutions for managing finance 
This section outlines the kinds of systems described in the literature for the 
management of financial resources. 
3.3.1 Viable electric utilities 
As noted earlier, financially viable utilities are frequently argued to be the most 
important institutional requirement for electrification programmes to succeed. 
Without financial viability, electricity authorities are unlikely to be able to 
maintain existing supply systems, and will have even less capacity to expand 
their systems to serve unconnected households. If their revenues are insufficient 
to cover costs and earn a return on their capital sufficient to provide for future 
investment, it is most unlikely that they will be able to attract private loan or 
equity finance. Moreover, government grant finance is usually an unsustainable 
source of finance in developing countries. 
Clearly, although of primary importance, financial viability is only one criterion 
for successful utility performance, along with others such as technical 
competence. 
3.3.2 Electrification financing institutions 
In Brazil, the raising of finance is done centrally by Eletrobas, the central co-
ordinating electricity utility which also plans and executes electricity policy (De 
Oliveira 1992:40). In other words, the bulk raising of finance is done centrally, 
while operations are managed at a more decentralised level by other utilities in 
the sector. The principle of raising bulk finance centrally, close to the point of 
electrification planning, is also one of the motivations behind the proposals for 
an Electrification Fund in the South African context (EPRET 1993:28). 
In the USA, the rural electricity cooperative movement established a non-profit 
corporation to raise bulk finance to complement concessionary finance provided 
by the state. The US cooperative system will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
In Thailand, where about 80% of rural villages and 70% of rural households 
have been connected, there are two financing ·options for unelectrified areas 
(Dingley 1988:E-5,6): 
• Non-contributory schemes, in terms of which the state-funded 
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) pays the full cost of 
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connection. The number of villages to be connected in each province 
is determined in proportion to the number of unconnected villages, 
hence advancing electrification equitably. 
• Contributory schemes, in terms of which communes or villages have 
to contribute 30% of the cost, by way of. materials, labour or money 
in order to be electrified. Hence these villages get connected earlier 
than they would otherwise have been; it is reported that wealthy 
people often contribute more than their share to get connected 
sooner. 
Using these arrangements, Thailand aimed to connect nearly 500 000 new 
customers per year during the period 1987 to 1991, only one quarter of which 
were in previously unelectrified areas. Based on these targets, the average 
connection rate for the 15 years from 1976 to 1991 would have been 400 000 per 
annum (ibid:E-12). 
On a smaller scale, loan funds have also been proposed to raise finance for 
purchasers of photovoltaic (PV) systems, who are usually unable to afford the 
upfront capital costs (Waddle and Perlack 1992:1258). This was done on a small 
scale for PV systems in the Dominican Republic, in which over 100 PV systems 
were financed in a 5 year period, and another 600 or so sold for cash. Similarly, 
the Philippines government established a loan fund financed by the 
Development Bank to fund residential energy systems (ibid:1258). 
3.3.3 Electricity cooperatives 
Electricity cooperatives have been established in many countries, especially in 
rural areas, with varying degrees of success. 
Possibly most well-known and successful, are those of the US National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association. With President Roosevelt's support in 1935, 
the state established a scheme to provide long-term concessionary finance (and 
other comprehensive assistance) to rural cooperatives through the Rural 
Electrification Administration (REA) (Dingley 1988:5,7, C-4). In addition to 
support for the electrification of households, the REA also included lending for 
productive activities, especially those related to agriculture (such as for silos), 
thus contributing to overall development goals. Between 1935 and 1987, the 
REA made loans totalling $20 billion to cooperatives, with only $45000 bad 
debts (ibid:ll). The financing arrangements favour borrowers: the term of the 
loans was initially 25 years but was lengthened to 35 years in 1944, and the 
interest rate was fixed at 2% until 1973 after which it became 5% (still lower 
than market rates) although special cases still pay only 2% (ibid:C-4). From 
1969, the REA undertook to finance only 70% of total requirements, and so the 
cooperative movement formed the National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance 
Corporation (CFC). As noted earlier, the CFC is a non-profit institution with the 
main aim of raising bulk finance at commercial rates to complement the REA's 
concessionary financing. As a result of these financing arrangements, rural 
consumers in the US have never had to make up-front capital contributions for 
their connection costs. 
A related institutional arrangement found in the USA, is that of the joint action 
agency UAA). This arrangement helps achieve economies of scale by acting on 
behalf of a number of smaller electricity utilities or cooperatives, for instance by 
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purchasing materials in bulk (and at lower cost). This is particularly useful 
where electricity authorities are small and would otherwise have limited 
implementation capacity and purchasing power. 
Bangladesh also has a network of rural electricity <;:_ooperatives, which appears 
to operate relatively well. The state-funded Rural Electrification Board (REB) on-
lends to PBSs (Palli Bidyut Samities, which are autonomous member-owned 
cooperatives) at low interest rates: 0.75% per annum during a 5 - 8 year grace 
period and 2- 3% for an additional 25 years (World Bank 1990b:10). 
Although not strictly the same as cooperatives, Bond (1992:153) argues for the 
use of community-based institutions such as Development Trusts, Loan Funds 
and Corporations to control and optimise the development process associated 
with electrification, including the management of finances. 
3.3.4 Separate Rural Electrification institutions 
The successful American REA and rural cooperative system was much more 
than a financing institution: it also provided education, advice, innovation and 
appliance finance (Dingley 1988:C-7). Perhaps recognising this factor, many 
authors have argued for the establishment of separate institutions to manage 
rural electrification (RE) programmes; for example, Kjellstrom et al (1992:185) 
in the Tanzanian context and Foley (1990:126) in a more general context 
Foley argues strongly for a separate RE institution, on the basis that 
performance objectives for RE are not confused with those of urban and 
industrial markets, since the obvious need for an external subsidy in RE 
programmes could cause severe distortions in results of utilities if not kept 
separate. In addition, Foley suggests that this independence might be more 
attractive for foreign funders and donors, who would not allocate concessionary 
finance, intended for RE, to national utilities. 
In the Algerian utility, RE was separated from the rest of the utility's operations 
by forming a separate division, and this appeared to operate successfully 
(ibid:127). Similar procedures were adopted in Ireland for the electrification of 
its rural areas. 
While these arguments are well-supported in the literature, it is also 
acknowledged that other less successful cases clearly demonstrate the need to 
'ensure that the model used for the rural electrification agency fits comfortably within 
its national context' (Foley 1990:130). The important point arising from this is that 
RE, since it invariably operates without financial viability as in wealthier areas, 
must be managed in such a way that its relatively poor financial results do not 
distort the results of other parts of the utility in which financial performance is 
a more important criterion. This could be achieved within South African utilities 
if, for example, the excess capital costs for rural connections over and above a 
fixed parameter or ceiling are subsidised from outside the utility. 
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3.4 Key success factors for the financing of electrification 
This section briefly identifies and summarises several key factors which have 
emerged from the literature review. 
Governments have a key role to play 
In no cases described in the literature have significant gains been made in the 
widening of access to electricity, without the active and sustained involvement 
of the state. It is clear that government has a key role to play in facilitating the 
flow of private capital to electrification programmes, as well as in making 
available concessionary finance from the fiscus where this is required. The exact 
role of the state will vary widely, from the provision of capital subsidies, to the 
provision of guarantees for private loan finance, to imposing taxes and levies 
to raise finance for electrification. 
The ESI must maintain its financial viability 
One of the most important themes in the present literature review is that of the 
need for electricity utilities to recover their ability to invest. This was expressed 
as follows by De Oliveira (1991:83): 'The most pressing issue that ESis in 
developing countries have to face is this financial crisis, since financial viability is a 
precondition for achieving the objectives set for utilities. The difficult situation of 
developing countries' public accounts leaves little, if any, scope for financial support 
from governments. Moreover, private banks and multilateral and bilateral financial 
sources are not prepared to lend to utilities in developing countries unless they recover 
financial soundness. They therefore have to improve their financial situation, mainly 
by increasing their net revenues. This will improve both their self-financing ratio and, 
hopefully, the willingness of private capital either to invest directly or provide loans.' 
This, in tum, requires a 'profound review of pricing policy' so that operating 
surpluses can be produced: 'Average prices must more than cover average costs, 
although prices should accommodate equity objectives and regional policies' (ibid:102). 
Utilities must be able to attract private capital 
Since it is unlikely and probably undesirable that utilities will be able to finance 
all their investment from internally-generated funds, and since external sources 
of finance (from government and foreign donors) are finite and inadequate, it 
is essential that utilities are able raise private capital. 
Rural electrification will require concessionary finance 
It is clear that rural electrification will, in many cases, compromise the financial 
viability of utilities, and so concessionary finance will usually be required for 
such projects if they are desirable for economic, social or political reasons. 
As Foley (1990:109) points out: 'Experience shows that rural electrification 
programmes are rarely able to finance themselves. Accepting that programmes are rarely 
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likely to be profitable does not, however, mean abandoning financial discipline. Rather, 
it emphasises the need to pitch tariffs at a level which reduces losses as much as possible 
while still ensuring that RE plays its part in the balanced development of the rural 
areas.' He argues that concessionary finance is required, coupled with cross-
subsidies from urban and industrial consumers (ibid:ll3). 
Financing and pricing arrangements should minimise distortions 
Whilst acknowledging that cross-subsidies and other interventions are required 
to achieve electrification goals, it is also important that distortions in the system 
are minimised. For example, capital subsidy schemes should not prejudice 
alternatives such as Remote Area Power Supplies (RAPS). The same applies to 
operating costs where rural grid electricity consumers may receive a cross-
subsidy from urban consumers, but rural RAPS consumers do not. In such 
cases, transparent compensatory mechanisms may be required (Harrington 1986, 
Hourcade et al1990:867). 
Financing of appliances may be important 
A major constraint on the viability of electricity systems from both end-user and 
utility perspectives, even where the price of electricity is 'reasonable', is the cost 
of appliances which also deters people from connecting (Pearce and Webb 
1987:336). Hence financing is required, to overcome the barriers to entry posed 
not only by high connection costs, but also by expensive electric appliances. 




4. Financial management 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this section is to report on an international literature review of 
the practices of financial management in the electricity supply and distribution 
industry. Unlike electricity pricing policy or to a lesser extent funding policy, 
the principles of 'correct' financial management are well known and generally 
widely accepted. However, the practical application of these principles varies 
widely amongst electricity utilities. Hence this section focuses on analysing 
financial management practices used in various electricity utilities world-wide. 
This section begins by describing the research methodology used. It should be 
noted that the scope is limited to an international review of what are seen as 
some of the key issues in financial management. In particular, financial 
management is reviewed in the context of accounting policy, revenue policy 
and debt policy. The body of the report concludes with a justification for 
transparency as an important principle underlying financial management 
practices in the electricity supply and distribution industry. The section 
concludes with a summary of the key findings. 
The majority of research for this paper was conducted through a desk-based 
review of Annual Reports and Financial Statements of various international 
utilities. The utilities chosen for this review were selected primarily on the basis 
of the availability of reliable and current information. The utilities chosen, differ 
from each other in terms of ownership and function. Appendix A contains a 
brief description of the activities and ownership of each utility. Literature on 
financial management practices in the electricity utility industry is extremely 
thin. However a few relevant documents, detailed in the bibliography, are 
referenced in this paper. The literature review was supplemented by 
consultation with various local and international experts. Where applicable, 
views expressed by these experts are referenced in the document. 
4.2 Accounting policies 
Accounting policies directly impact the revenue, expenditure and hence 
profitability of any undertaking. There is considerable debate on which is the 
best accounting methodology. Most electric utilities are known to practise 
historic cost accounting, some practise historic cost accounting plus revaluation, 
while others practise current cost accounting. There are no electric utilities in 
the developed world which are known to practise fund accounting.13 Certainly 
in the research for this review, no utilities beyond the borders of South Africa 
were found to practise fund accounting. 
The prevalence of historical cost accounting in the electricity industry world-
wide is due to the fact that it is seen to be more objective and less open to 
In the opinion of Dirk Els, Financial Planning Manager, Eskom. 
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dispute or manipulation than current cost valuations. Mayer & Helm (1989: 13), 
however argue against the use of historical accounting. Their argument is that 
historical cost accounting is particularly inappropriate in public sector utilities 
on account of the long life of assets that are employed. Even during periods of 
low inflation, historical cost valuations are seriously distorted by previous . 
periods of inflation. In a paper reviewing World Bank lending for electric 
power, Munasinghe et al (1988: 88) argue, that for electricity undertakings in 
6096 of countries reviewed, conventional historical cost accounting without any 
revaluation of assets is practised. Opposition to the revaluation of assets, 
particularly in less developed countries exists, because of concerns of their 
governments that asset revaluation would contribute to inflation. 
It is clear that although historical cost accounting is widely practised, it leads 
to accounting valuations which are severely distorted compared to economic or 
actual valuations (Mayer & Helm 1989: 7). This was the conclusion of the Mayer 
report, produced prior to the reorganisation of the UK ESI. A number of 
alternatives to conventional historical cost accounting do exist. The most 
common of which are historical cost accounting plus revaluation, or current cost 
accounting. 
Historical cost accounting plus revaluation is generally one of the most widely 
accepted alternatives. It is normal practice for the World Bank to require the 
revaluation of assets. This requirement is normally included as part of the 
World Bank's loan covenant to developing country utilities (Munasinghe et al 
1988). An example of this is a World Bank loan to Botswana Power Corporation 
where the World Bank prescribed a certain rate of return on assets, on a 
revalued asset base. Of the 23 utilities reviewed in this paper (see Table 5), with 
the exception of the few practising current cost accounting, only Botswana 
Power Corporation and Korea Power Company were found to have 
incorporated revaluation into their accounting systems. There are various 
methods for revaluing assets. These methods include stating assets at 
replacement cost, disposable value, or revaluing assets on the basis of some 
appropriate index. A principal criticism against historical cost plus revaluation 
is that the method of revaluation is highly subjective in view of the fact that 
reliable and accurate information, in most cases,does not exist. 
Current cost accounting is seen to be practised in three different countries in 
this review. The line between current cost accounting and historical cost plus 
revaluation is vague. Essentially the difference is that current cost accounting 
is a comprehensive approach which attempts to restate all assets, liabilities, 
income and expenditure so that the full set of accounts are a reflection of 
economic realities. By contrast, historical cost plus revaluation is usually limited 
to the revaluation of specific assets only. Current cost accounting as 
recommended by Mayer & Helm (1989) is practised in the UK industry and all 
the Regional Electricity Companies, National Power, PowerGen, Nuclear Power 
and the National Grid Company. These companies produce both historical and 
current cost accounts. Of the utilities reviewed it was also found that current 
cost accounting is used in Iceland (almost no inflation) and Israel (high 
inflation). Conceptually, current cost accounting is clear, however the practical 
process of arriving at what are construed as current cost accounts, is less dear. 
As far as current cost accounting relates to asset valuation, Mayer & Helm 
(1989: 17) recommended a process for the UK that starts with the calculation of 
the 'length of life of company assets' and 'capital goods price' indices. Assets 
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are then valued individually at replacement cost, but if the economic valuation 
of any asset is lower than replacement cost, then such assets should be valued 
at economic (or value to the owner) values. Economic valuations are computed 
by taking a projection of the cash flows that are expected to be earned and 
discounting these at an appropriate risk adjusted qiscount rate to the present. 
In the case of power generation assets, where generation stations currently have 
spare capacity, or are expected to have spare capacity in the near future, then 
present values are expected to fall below replacement costs. Revenues are then 
determined on the basis of an assumed price profile taking account of any price 
regulation that is expected to be imposed. 
In Iceland, Landsvirkjun arrive at current costs in a different way: the original 
cost of property is revalued to year-end prices. For this purpose the original 
cost is divided into two parts. One part, representing local Icelandic cost, is 
estimated as one third of total original cost, while the other part, representing 
foreign cost, is estimated as two thirds of the original cost. The local portion is 
revalued in accordance with changes in the Icelandic 'index of construction 
cost', while the foreign portion is revalued in accordance with changes in the 
exchange value of the Krona. 
In Israel yet another variation of current cost accounting exists. Israel has been 
through periods of very high inflation and for this reason adjustments for 
current cost accounts are based on monthly inflation figures. Non-monetary 
items (fixed assets and accumulated depreciation thereon, expenses on the issue 
of debentures, inventory, prepaid expenses, receipts for unfinished contracts, 
perpetual debentures, capital reserves and shareholders equity) have been 
adjusted according to the changes in the 'cost of living index' from the month 
in which each transaction was affected, up to the index published for the month 
in which the accounting period ended. In contrast with the UK version of 
current cost accounts, the adjusted values of non-monetary assets do not 
necessarily represent the market value of those assets or their value to the 
concern, but only their cost as adjusted for changes in the general purchasing 
power of the Shekel. 
4.3 Revenue policies 
One of the key aspects of financial management relates to revenue policy. 
Arguably, the essence of revenue policy is the determination of the balance 
between risk and return. A wealth of literature exists on the theory of 
determining the optimal balance of risk and return. One of the most popular 
models is the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Others include the Discounted Cash 
Flow Model, the Risk Premium Model or the Arbitrage Pricing Theory. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a discussion of these theories or 
how and where they are applied. A review of revenue policy in the electricity 
industry is more practically dealt with by firstly drawing a distinction between 
revenue policy in competitive and non-competitive settings and then presenting 
and analysing the rate of return on assets for various different utilities. 
There is an important distinction to be drawn between revenue policy defined 
in competitive and non-competitive industries. In a non-competitive industry, 
the revenue policy demands that prices are computed from valuations of assets 
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and their required rate of return. In competitive industries, the process is 
reversed: the price is determined by market supply and demand, and the 
market value of the company is then established as the value of the future 
stream of profits discounted back to the present by the appropriate rate of 
return required to cover risk and the market cost of _foregoing current earnings. 
Another important distinction to be drawn, is between those utilities which 
have privately held and tradeable equity capital and those that do not. In the 
case of the former, the measurement of return on invested capital is the Return 
on Equity, while in the case of the latter, the rate of return is measured through 
the Return on Assets. · 
Table 5 below presents a list of different electricity utilities and figures for their 
Return on Assets and the Consumer Price Index (where ROA is calculated on 
historical cost accounts). The RetUrn on Equity has been calculated for those 
utilities that have listed equity capital. 
Before the information in Table 5 can be interpreted, it is necessary to explain 
the calculation of Return on Assets and Return on Equity used here. 
1. The Return on Assets is calculated as the ratio of net income (after 
interest and taxation but before dividends) to the average net fixed 
assets for the year under review. Average net fixed assets are 
tangible assets and do not include Investments. 
2. The Return on Equity is defined as net income (after interest and 
taxation but before dividends) divided by Shareholders Capital plus 
Distributable Reserves. 
3. The earlier section on current cost accounting discussed the varying 
application of the principle in the calculation of current costs 
accounts for the various utilities in this review. For want of a better 
assumption, in this analysis it is assumed that where current cost 
asset valuations are used to calculate the return, that the ROA (and 
ROE where applicable) so calculated is the real return. 
4. Utilities with older fixed assets will have lower net asset values 
because of the higher accumulated depreciation. This will impact 
the Return on Assets. No attempt has been made in the above 
analysis to account for the age of the assets in the calculation of the 
return. 
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Table 5 Return On Assets 
Utility Accounting ROA CPI 
Methodology (96) (96) 
1 London Electricity pic (UK) (1989/90) Current Cost 4.05 N/A 
2 South Western Electricity pic (UK) Current Cost 5.1 N/A 
(1992/93) 
3 Seeboard pic (UK) (1992/93) Current cost 4.6 N/A 
4 Landsvirkjun, Iceland Current Cost 0.8 N/A 
5 Israel Electric Corporation Ltd Current cost 0.4 N/A 
6 Eskom (South Africa) Historical 3.8 12 
7 Botswana Power Corporation Historical & 5.3 16 
Revaluation 
8 Korea Electric Power Corporation Historical & 7.0 6.5 
Revaluation 
9 Boston Edison Power Company Historical 3.3 3.2 
10 Duke Power Company (USA) Historical 4.7 3.2 
11 Texas Utilities Co. Historical 3.1 3.2 
12 Southern California Edison Corporation Historical 3.8 3.2 
13 Energy Corporation, New Orleans, USA Historical 3.0 3.2 
14 Philadelphia Electric Company Historical 3.8 3.2 
15 Commonwealth Edison, Chicago, (USA) Historical 2.8 3.2 
16 British Colombia Hydro (Canada) Historical 2.4 1.5 
17 Chubu Electric Power Company (Japan) Historical 1.3 1.5 
18 China Power and Light (Hong Kong) Historical 18.4 10 
19 Electricity Supply Authority of Cyprus Historical 8.1 6.5 
20 Auckland Power Board, New Zealand Historical 2.7 5 
21 Electricity Generating Authority, Thailand Historical 6.7 4.7 
22 Escom (Malawi) Historical 15 15 
23 Electricite de France Historical 1.1 2.5 
24 Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority Historical (4.7) 44 
The following observations in respect of information contained in Table 5, are 
made: 
• Most of the utilities show a positive real return on assets. The return 
on privately held equity capital is obviously much higher. In 
American electricity utilities, historical cost accounting is used 
universally. Although the electric utility industry has a high degree 
of private ownership, the utilities are not at liberty to set their own 
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prices. Instead a highly complex regulatory structure exists whereby 
the revenue requirements of a particular utility have to be approved 
by regulatory commissions inside of the Federal State as well as the 
national Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to attempt to describe the regulatory process, 
however the essence of rate of return regulation in the US is 
relatively simple: utilities argue for a specific level of revenue to 
finance their operations, based on their financial analyses. The 
Federal regulatory commissions usually argue that the required 
level of revenue is too high. Disputes usually revolve around asset 
valuations or whether stated plant construction costs have been 
"reasonably" incurred. Issues are frequently resolved at Supreme 
Court or Appeal Court level. 
• London Electricity, Seeboard and SWEB are primarily electricity 
distribution companies, created on Vesting Day, 31 March 1990. As 
a result of efforts to create competition in the UK industry, the 
Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) regulates the industry by 
not allowing price increases greater than the Retail Price Index (RPI) 
minus a factor 'X' (where X corresponds with expected efficiency 
gains). It is important to understand the difference between the 
determination of the Return on Assets via the price control formula 
in the UK ESI and the direct, usually government prescribed, rate 
of return on assets which are used to set prices for all other utilities 
in this review. In effect the RPI-X formula is an attempt to replicate 
the competitive approach to the determination of Return on Assets, 
as described earlier. Since Vesting Day, X has been zero and the 
handsome current cost Returns on Assets and on Equity reported, 
are indicative of productivity improvements which have been 
achieved. OFFER will review the price control formula in April 1994 
with an expected focus on improving efficiency by increasing the 
value of X. 
• Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) is another interesting case. Its 
rate of return on revalued assets of 5.3% compares to consumer 
price inflation of 16% at the time of the report (although such a 
comparison may not be very meaningful, since the asset base is 
revalued but returns are at historical costs). Under a loan covenant 
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
BPC was required to meet the required 8% return on revalued net 
fixed assets. This was opposed by the Botswana government since 
it would have necessitated an increase in tariffs in excess of 20%, 
which in the Botswana Government's view, would have had serious 
ramifications on the rapidly developing Botswana economy. 
• Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority reported a disastrous result 
in their 1991 financial year, achieving a negative return on assets of 
4.7%. The origin of this dire situation is that between 1962 and 1980, 
the nominal price of electricity increased by only 0.8% (Zia Mian 
1982: 95), while inflation was considerably higher. Prices did not 
increase due to the fact that on the basis of low historical asset and 
debt servicing costs, it was possible to achieve a nominal return on 
assets without increasing the price. However, with no account being 
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taken of the inflation rate, the real return on assets decreased 
dramatically so that by 1991, considerable losses were being made. 
• Almost all utilities in this analysis show a positive real Return on 
Assets. 
The discussion thus far has focused mostly on successful utilities in developed 
countries. Munasinghe et al (1988: 19) reported distressing declines in the 
historical cost Return on Assets of the power sector in developing countries 
between 1966 and 1985. The 1966/1973 average was 9.2% and this had fallen 
to an average of 6% between 1980/1985 despite significant increases in the 
inflation rate in most developing countries. 
The World Bank has used the Return on Assets as an indicator to monitor the 
financial performance of utilities and the ratio is usually used as part of a loan 
covenant. An example of this noted earlier was the case of IBRD loans to the 
Botswana Power Corporation. 
4.4 Debt policies 
Most electric utilities in the developing world fund much of their capital 
investment through debt. Lenders will lend capital at an interest rate which 
reflects their perception of the risk involved. This risk is dependent on two 
factors: the ability to repay interest and the ability to ultimately redeem the 
capital debt on due date. There are various ways of monitoring and analysing 
debt. Munasinghe et al (1988: 63-6) recommend the use of three ratios in 
monitoring the debt of electric utilities: 
The first is the self-financing ratio, defined as: "Funds from internal sources 
equivalent to a defined percentage of average annual capital expenditures, after meeting 
operating expenses (before allowance for depreciation), debt seroice, taxes, dividends, 
increases in working capital and other significant cash outflows." However, it is 
difficult to compare the self-financing ratio amongst different utilities because 
of inconsistencies in the calculation of changes in working capital and differing 
taxation structures amongst utilities. 
The second is the interest coverage ratio. This is the ratio of net income before 
interest and taxes, divided by the total interest expense. The ratio is a good 
measure of whether the utility has earned sufficient revenues to meet interest 
commitments on outstanding debt after meeting operating costs. 
The third is the debt to equity ratio, which is the ratio of long term debt to equity 
(assets- liabilities). It is not possible to argue that a particular value of the debt 
to equity ratio is necessarily the correct ratio since different utilities will be able 
to support differing debt loads based on their unique circumstances. 
Furthermore, where a financially sound government is prepared to underwrite 
a utility's debt commitments, much higher debt to equity ratios can be 
supported. Table 6 contains the debt/ equity ratio and the interest coverage ratio 
for the various utilities in this review. 
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Table 6 Debt/equity ratio and Interest Coverage ratio 
Utility Debt/Equity Interest 
coverage ratio 
London Electricity pic (UK) (1989/90) Close to 0 Very high 
South Western Electricity pic (UK) 0.09 6.9 
(1992/93) 
Seeboard pic (UK) (1992!93) 0.12 19.1 
Landsvirkjun, Iceland 1.43 1.72 
Israel Electric Corporation Ltd 1.3 1.17 
Eskom (South Africa) 2.2 1.53 
Botswana Power Corporation 1.1 1.1 
Korea Electric Power Corporation 1.1 3.03 
Boston Edison Power Company (USA) 1.3 2.5 
Duke Power Company (USA) 0.9 4 
Texas Utilities Co. (USA) 1.06 2.5 
Southern California Edison Corp (USA) 1 3.6 
Energy Corporation, New Orleans, (USA) 1.14 2.4 
Philadelphia Electric Company (USA) 1.2 3.3 
Commonwealth Edison, Chicago, (USA) 1.3 3.7 
British Colombia Hydro (Canada) 3.76 1.26 
Chubu Electric Power Company (Japan) 3.2 2.2 
China Power and Light (Hong Kong) 0.54 10.4 
Electricity Supply Authority of Cyprus 0.16 22 
Auckland Power Board, New Zealand 0.3 2.06 
Electricity Generating Authority, Thailand 1.5 2.2 
Escom (Malawi) 1.08 3.7 
Electricite de France 0.6 1.36 
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority 2 0.7 
• An interesting case is London Electricity. The results for 1989/90, 
the last year before it was created as a public limited company, 
indicate the extremely low level of debt in the industry at the time 
of its privatisation. These lower debt levels result in higher interest 
coverage ratios, as also reflected in the 1993 results for South 
Western Electricity and Seeboard, other UK distribution companies. 
• British Colombia Hydro has a relatively high debt to equity ratio. 
However BC Hydro's outstanding debt is either held or guaranteed 
as to principal and interest by the Province of British Columbia. 
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Furthermore, the interest cover ratio of 1.26 indicates that there is 
sufficient income to cover their interest expenditure. 
• Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority presents an interesting case 
of where the debt/ equity ratio hides a debt crisis. A debt to equity 
ratio of 2 is not unduly high for an eiectncity utility and yet the 
interest coverage ratio of 0.7 indicates that they are clearly not able 
to meet their interest commitments. 
• The similar debt/ equity and interest coverage ratios of the US 
utilities indicates uniformity brought about through the Federal 
Electricity Regulatory Commission. An interesting trend in the US 
electricity industry at present is that a number of independent 
power producers are constructing power stations, funded largely by 
debt, on the basis of firm power contracts from purchasing utilities. 
For these utilities, debt/equity ratios of 10 are not unusual.14 
Perhaps a central comment to be made on the subject of debt management is 
that the debt/equity ratio, of itself, is not the key issue. It is clearly not suitable 
to take an orthodox view of what a 'correct' debt/equity ratio should be, 
because of the many different factors which may influence any particular 
utility's ability to manage its debt. Rather the central issue is that of the risk 
attached to the financial policies and strategies employed by the utility. 
4.5 Transparency of financial management 
The review thus far has focused on three areas of financial management: 
accounting policy, revenue policy and debt policy. An important factor 
underlying every aspect of financial management is the need to ensure 
transparency. This has implications at many levels: from the basic book-keeping 
systems to the production of a clear and accurate set of accounts. It is noted that 
the accounts of all the utilities reviewed in this paper, were submitted to 
external audit. While this ensures that reported results are in accordance with 
the accepted accounting principles, it does not address the equally important 
issue that the accepted accounting policies facilitate the production of a 
representative set of results. With regard to the latter point, evidence from this 
review would seem to suggest that it is only in the UK, as a result of the 
privatisation of the UK power industry, that any significant amount of work has 
been done on the subject of producing accounts which are economically 
representative, that is, utilising current accounting methods. 
Munasinghe et al (1988:19) describe World Bank difficulties in ensuring 
transparency. In its initiatives to monitor the performance of utilities in 
developing countries, the World Bank has instituted very specific guidelines as 
to how its performance indicator ratios should be drawn-up. Adherence to these 
guidelines in the case of some ratios has, however been poor, with the result 
Information obtained from discussion with Larron Harper, Director: Global 
Utilities Institute, Samford University, Alabama. 
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that making effective comparisons between utilities is limited. 
4.6 Summary 
This section has set out some of the key factors relating to financial 
management in the electricity supply and distribution industry. The document 
does not purport to be a complete review on the subject: it is recognised that 
there are a number of subjects of financial management that have been 
excluded in this review. 
The key conclusions from each section of this review are as follows: 
Accounting policy 
• Fund accounting is not known to be practised in any electricity 
utilities in the developed world. 
• Historical cost accounting is widely used in the industry. However 
in view of the very long life of assets in the electricity industry, it 
is an inadequate accounting approach even in the case of countries 
with low inflation. 
• Historical cost plus revaluation will produce accounts which are 
more representative of economic realities. Revaluation is normally 
prescribed by the World Bank in their loan covenants. 
• It was found that Current Cost Accounting is practised in the UK 
electricity industry as well as Iceland and Israel. While the principle 
of current cost accounting is uniform among the utilities practising 
this methodology, it was found that the practical method of arriving 
at current costs differed considerably among the various utilities. 
Revenue policy 
• There is a distinction to be drawn between the determination of 
Rates of Return in a competitive and non-competitive industry. 
• Of the 23 utilities reviewed, most were seen to be making a positive 
real Return on Assets. 
• Return on Assets amongst the US utilities was relatively uniform 
owing to their common regulatory structure. 
• Rate of Return regulation in the UK through the RPI-X formula has 
resulted in the newly privatised Regional Electricity Companies 
achieving a relatively high real Return on Assets. 
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Debt policy 
• Three ratios are referred to in the management of debt: self-
financing ratio, debt/ equity ratio and interest coverage ratio. 
• The debt/equity ratio ranged between .. 3.76 for British Columbia 
Hydro to 0.09 for South Western Electricity pic. 
• It is not suitable to take an orthodox view of what an acceptable 
debt/ equity ratio should be, since the debt which any particular 
utility is able to manage is dependent on that utility's unique 
circumstances. 
Transparency 
• Transparency is an important factor underlying every aspect of 
financial management. Without a commitment to transparency it is 
impossible to determine the actual performance of any utility or to 
make effective comparisons with other utilities. 
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5. Conclusion 
This report has reviewed international experience in pncmg, financing and 
financial management in electrification programmes. Relevant conclusions are: 
• The ability of electricity utilities to maintain and expand electricity services 
is severely prejudiced if its financial viability is undermined through 
inappropriate pricing, financing and financial management policies. 
• Electricity pricing and financing should be undertaken within an integrated 
energy planning framework which establishes overall development goals 
and balances policy objectives between different economic and energy 
sectors. 
• Economic efficiency and long run marginal costs are not the only criteria to 
be applied to deriving prices for domestic electricity consumers. Equity 
considerations and the financial viability of the utility have often taken 
precedence. 
• Price regulation should be transparent and arms-length and should not 
result in the viability of the utility being undermined. 
• Tariff levels should, as far as possible, attempt to achieve overall cost 
recovery for the household sector. 
• Appropriate price signals (eg time-of-use tariffs) should be passed on to 
those consumers capable of adjusting their load patterns. 
• To achieve greater equity and access, tariff structures should allow for low 
connection fees. 
• External subsidies may be required for the lowest income categories as well 
as for rural electrification. 
• Where the possibility of external subsidies is constrained, cross-subsidies 
may be affected through uniform tariffs between high and low consumers 
or urban and rural areas. 
• To minimise distortions in pricing signals, subsidies should first be applied 
to capital costs of connection, before energy charges through the tariff. 
• Governments have a key role to play in facilitating the flow of private 
capital to electrification programmes, as well as making available 
concessionary finance from the fiscus where this is required. 
• Electricity utilities must maintain financial viability by ensuring that 
average prices more than cover their average costs. This will improve their 
self-financing ratio and the willingness of private capital, either to invest 
directly or to provide loans. 
• Utilities must be able to attract private capital as it is unlikely and probably 
undesirable that utilities will be able to finance all their investment from 
internally-generated funds and since available external sources of· finance 
from government and foreign donors is generally insufficient. 
• Rural electrification will, in many cases, compromise the financial viability 
of utilities and so concessionary finance will be required for such projects 
if they are desirable for economic, social or political reasons. 
• Financing is required to overcome the barriers to entry posed not only by 
high connection costs, but also by expensive electric appliances. 
• Current cost accounting methods are recommended, but the most 
commonly used is the historical cost accounting method. 
• The debt to equity ratio, the self-financing ratio and especially the interest 
coverage ratio are three useful measures to monitor financial performance 
of utilities, although 'desirable' ratios depend on utilities' specific 
cirumstances. 
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Appendix A 
1-3. London Electricity plc, South Western Electricity plc, Seeboard plc 
are Regional Electricity Companies whose principle function is the 
distribution of electricity. They are pul:?,lic limited companies with 
private shareholders. 
4. Landsvirkjun is a generator and supplier of electricity only. It is 
jointly owned by the State Treasury and the Cities of Reykjavic and 
Akureyri. 
5. Israel Electric Corporation Ltd is a vertically integrated company, 
generating, transmitting and distributing electricity throughout 
Israel. It has private shareholders. 
6. Eskom has been included in this analysis for comparison purposes. 
Eskom is a vertically integrated parastatal. 
7. Botswana Power Corporation is vertically integrated corporation 
falling under the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs. 
8. Korea Electric Power Corporation is a vertically integrated 
corporation with 79% State ownership and 21% private ownership. 
9-15. Boston Edison Power Company, Duke Power Company, Texas 
Utilities, Southern California Edison, Energy Corporation, 
Philadelphia Electric Company and Commonwealth Edison are 
privately owned, vertically integrated utilities. 
16 British Colombia Hydro is a vertically integrated provincial Crown 
Corporation. 
17. Chubu Electric Power Company is a vertically integrated and 
privately owned power company. 
18. China Power and Light is a privately owned, vertically incorporated 
power corporation in Hong Kong. 
19. The Electricity Supply Authority of Cyprus is a vertically integrated, 
non-profit making Semi-Government Corporation. 
20. Auckland Power Board is a distribution company owned by the 
government to serve the residents of Auckland. 
21. Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand is a State Enterprise 
which supplies and transmits power in Thailand. 
22. Escom is a vertically integrated Commission, responsible to 
President Banda. 
23. Electricite de France is a vertically integrated parastatal corporation 
23. Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority is a vertically integrated 
Authority reporting to the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources 
and Development. 
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